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It’s Elementary 
A Monthly Column by EFAP Director John Yinger 
October 2012 
Holding Tax Shares Constant Is a Bad Idea: What the Homestead Tax Option in New York
Can Teach Us about Romney’s Income Tax Proposal 
The Republican presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, has proposed a tax system in which 
the share of taxes paid by the top 1 percent of taxpayers remains constant.  In an interview on 
“Face the Nation” on June 17, 2012, Mr. Romney said that “one of the absolute requirements of 
any tax reform that I have in mind is that people who are at the high end, whether you call them 
the 1 percent or 2 percent or half a percent, that people at the high end will still pay the same 
share of the tax burden they’re paying now.”1    
 
New York State has some experience with this type of program design through its 
“Homestead Tax Option” for the property tax (HO for short).  This column describes the 
provisions that hold tax shares constant with the HO, discusses the experience with these 
provisions in cities that have adopted the HO, and explains why the use of this approach in the 
federal income tax would be a major disaster. 
 
 As discussed in my July 2012 column, the HO is a complicated possibility that allows a 
city to apply a different property tax rate to residential and nonresidential property.2  This option 
is attached to revaluation of the city’s taxable property.  A revaluation often leads to a situation 
in which the effective property tax rate (that is, taxes as a share of true market value) on 
residential property goes up and the effective property tax rate on commercial and industrial 
property goes down.  Some cities delay reassessing their property, even when their assessments 
are out-of-date, because this type of shift is unfair and unpopular.  As a result, they may retain a 
system with poor assessments that unfairly impose higher property taxes on some homeowners 
than on others whose houses have the same value. The HO is designed to encourage revaluation, 
along with its improvement in equity across homeowners, while preventing the unfair and 
unpopular shift in the tax burden from nonresidential to residential property. 
 
More specifically, the HO defines homestead property as single-family houses and 
apartment buildings with only a few units, and allows a city to adjust the homestead and non-
homestead property tax rates so that each type of property pays the same share of property taxes 
that it did before revaluation. This is a perfectly reasonable starting point.  The problem is that in 
1 The transcript for this interview is posted on the internet at:  http://www.cbsnews.com/2102-3460_162-
57454827.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody. Mr. Romney has made similar comments in other interviews. 
 
2 The full details of the HO can be found in the pamphlet, “The Homestead Option Tax,” published by the New 
York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Office of Real Property Tax Services in January 2011 and 
available at: http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/publications/orpts/homested.pdf.  Many of these details are not considered 
here, such as provisions that allow a jurisdiction to phase out the HO.  The quotation in the text is from this 
pamphlet.  The pamphlet says that the HO is used by “12 cities, 17 towns, four villages and 43 school districts.” 
 
 
                                                 
3 My July column did not provide the details of these adjustments.  I plan to provide a more complete explanation in 
a future column. 
 
4 Data on homestead and non-homestead property tax rates is difficult to come by.  These figures come from Kent 
Gardner, “Non-Homestead Tax Rates and City Competitiveness,” Center for Governmental Research Inc., available 
at: http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/10959.pdf  and Minnesota Taxpayers’ Association, “50-
State Property Tax Comparison Study,” various years, available at 
http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/significant-features-property-tax/resources.aspx . 
 
5 The algebra behind this assertion can be found in the appendix to this column. 
 
6 This figure and the following ones are documented in Emmanuel Saez, “Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top 




later years, the HO keeps the focus on tax shares instead of focusing on tax rates.  To be specific, 
the HO requires a city to adjust its effective tax rates for the two types of properties based on 
property tax shares. These requirements are not binding for small changes in the homestead or 
non-homestead tax bases, but they can have a major impact if long-term changes in these tax 
bases are large.3  
   
Because of these requirements, the effective tax rates for homestead and non-homestead 
property depend on long-term property value trends.  If the value of a city’s commercial and 
industrial property goes down without a large decline in city population (and hence in the value 
of homestead property), then this provision requires an increase in the effective property tax rate 
on business property. In contrast, rapid population decline in a city may have a relatively large 
impact on the homestead portion of the tax base and lead to an increase in the effective tax rate 
on homestead property.  These types of changes in the property tax rate have nothing to do with 
the problems caused by poor assessment and I do not know of any policy justification for them. 
 
In the case of Buffalo, NY, for example, the ratio of the non-homestead property tax rate 
to the homestead tax rate was 1.82 in 1995, about a decade after the implementation of the HO.  
This ratio went up to 2.82 in 1999, and then declined to 1.65 in 2011.4  This experience 
obviously introduces considerable uncertainty into the future path of property tax rates on 
commercial and industrial property. This uncertainty will make it difficult for businesses to plan 
their construction projects and may, indeed, discourage some of them from considering new 
projects at all. Moreover these changes in relative tax rates are unrelated to any fairness 
principles. 
 
Now let us turn to the Romney Rule for the federal income tax.  Any tax plan that holds 
the tax share of the top 1 percent constant requires the tax rate paid by the top 1 percent to 
decline as their income grows relative to the bottom 99 percent.5  From 1953 to 1981, the income 
of the top 1 percent earned about 10 percent of all income.6  This income share increased rapidly 
until it reached a peak of about 24 percent in 2007.  The latest income share, for 2010, is 20 
percent. The following table shows the relationship between the income share of the top 1 
percent and the tax rate that is required to hold the tax share of the top 1 percent constant. 
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Changes in the Tax Rate on the Top 1% that Are Required to Keep 
Their Tax Share Constant 
If the Income Share 
of the Top 1% Is: 
Then the Required 
Change in the Tax 
Rate of the Top 1% Is: 
And the New Rate for 
the Top 1% Is: 
15.0% 41.7% 34.0% 
16.0% 31.3% 31.5% 
17.0% 22.1% 29.3% 
18.0% 13.9% 27.3% 
19.0% 6.6% 25.6% 
20.0% 0.0% 24.0% 
21.0%  ‐6.0% 22.6% 
22.0%  ‐11.4% 21.3% 
23.0%  ‐16.3% 20.1% 
24.0%  ‐20.8% 19.0% 
25.0%  ‐25.0% 18.0% 
Note: These calculations hold total taxes and the income of the 
bottom 99% constant (or, equivalently, they hold the tax rate on the 
bottom 99% constant), they assume a starting income share of 20% 
for the top 1% (which was the share in 2010), and they assume a tax 
rate for the top 1% of 24% (the rate in 2009). 
This table indicates that an increase in this income share from its current (2010) value of 
20 percent back to 24 percent would require a 21 percent cut in the average tax rate of the top 1 
percent. The average tax rate of the top 1 percent was 24 percent in 2009, so this change in the 
income share would cut the tax rate of the top 1 percent down to 18 percent.7  In contrast, if the 
income share of the top 1 percent dropped to 15 percent, their average tax rate would have to 
increase by about 42 percent. 
 
Because the income share of the top 1 percent is difficult to predict, these results imply 
that the implementation of the Romney Rule would lead to enormous tax uncertainty for the 
nation’s wealthiest taxpayers. In doing their long-term tax planning, they would have to guess 
what their rate was going to be in the years ahead.  As in the case of the Homestead Option, this 
type of uncertainty is not a desirable feature of a tax system. 
 
Although the change in the income share of the top 1 percent is uncertain, the most likely 
outcome over the next few years is that this share will increase.  Recent evidence indicates, for 
example, that “the top 1% captured 93% of the income gains in the first year of recovery... It is 
likely that this uneven recovery has continued in 2011 as the stock market has continued to 
recover.”8  This suggests that the income share of the top 1 percent is likely to keep rising for the 
7 The average tax rate for the top 1 percent of taxpayers can be found at: http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats---
Individual-Statistical-Tables-by-Tax-Rate-and-Income-Percentile  
 
8 See the paper by Saez cited in Note 3. 
 
4 
next several years as the economy grows.  If so, the implementation of the Romney Rule would 
lead to a steadily declining tax rate for the wealthiest Americans, and to steadily declining 
fairness—at least by most people’s standards—in the federal income tax. 
 
In short, the Romney Rule is a bad idea and it should be rejected regardless of 
whether or not Mr. Romney becomes President.  
 
 
Appendix: The Algebra of the Romney Rule 
 
Let t stand for an average income tax rate and Y for the total income earned by a given 
group. Let a subscript “1” indicate the top 1 percent the income distribution and a subscript “99” 
indicate the bottom 99 percent.  The Romney Rule holds the share of taxes paid by the top 1 
percent to a given fixed value, say s. In symbols, the Romney Rule is: 
 
t Y
 1 1   s   
t Y1 1    t99  Y99  
 
This equation can be solved for the tax rate on the top 1 percent, namely, t1, that is 
required for the Romney Rule to hold.  The result: 
 
 s  Y 1   t99   
99  t     
 1 s  Y1  
 
This equation shows that the required tax rate on the top 1 percent declines whenever the income 
of the top 1 percent, Y1, grows relative to the income of the bottom 99 percent, Y99. 
 
Finally, the income of the top 1 percent can be expressed as a share, say r, of total income 
in the economy:  
Y
 1  r   
Y Y1  99  
 
This definition implies that (Y99/Y1) = (1 - r)/r. Substituting this expression into the above result 
yields another form of the Romney Rule: 
 
 s 1 r  t1    t99         
1 s  r   
 
This form of the Romney rule was used to generate the results in Table 1.  Because t99s/(1-s) = 
Ts/Y99, where T is total tax revenue, holding t99 constant is equivalent to holding T/Y99 constant. 
 
